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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
MYRNA FABRIZIO,

Appellant,

vs.

FIDELITY AND GUARANTY
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Respondent.

Case No.
12596

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an action filed by plaintiff, appellant,
claiming that a standard risk life insurance policy
was duly applied for and the risk accepted by the
defendant insurance company and that plaintiff is
entitled to the benefits thereon as the contingent
beneficiary of the deceased Delbert Fabrizio.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The respective parties filed Motions for Summary Judgment. Subsequently pursuant to the stipulation of the respective counsel made in open Court
that all of the depositions of the parties and copies
of the various correspondence, documents and papers attached thereto as exhibits and requests for
1

admissions af!d response thereto might all be received by the Court as evidence, and the said depositions
and attached exhibits and the requests for admissions and responses thereto all having been received
as evidence, and the evidence being closed, and the
parties having stipulated there would be no further
evidence and that the case as submitted and the said
proceedings would constitute the trial of the matte~
the trial Court entered judgment in favor of defendant respop.dent and against plaintiff appellant.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks to have the judgment on the
merits rendered by the trial Court affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Gale Holt, an employee of the Utah Central Insurance Agency (R 115) was a soliciting agent (R
148) authorized to solicit and submit to the Fidelity
and Guaranty Life Insurance Company applications
for insurance and annuities and to collect the first
premiums thereon and to forward them to the Fidelity and Guaranty Life Insurance Company hereinafter called defendant. (R 114; 115)
Neither Gale Holt nor his employer the Central
Utah Insurance Agency had authority to receive any
money on behalf of the company except the first premium, or to modify or extend credit in any respect
in behalf of the company or to modify or waive any
provision in any policy or application .or, to issue any
policy on behalf of the defendant. (R 114, 115, l96)

z

On June 27, 1967, Delbert Fabrizio the hus'
band of the plaintiff-appellant, Myrna Fabrizio, met
with his mother and father and Paul Murphy in the
office of the First Security Bank of Utah in Roosevelt. Paul Murphy, the manager of the bank was
making a bank loan to the deceased D~lbert Fabrizio
and plaintiff.
Paul Murphy suggested the deceased Delbert
Fabrizio should obtain additional life insurance although it was not necessary. At this suggestion, Gale
Holt "the soliciting agent" was called to the office
of the First Security Bank of Utah and while all parties were present, presented an application to Delbert Fabrizio for an ERT (Executive Reducing
Term) life insurance policy. (R 52, 53) Mr. Delbert
Fabrizio completed the application while all parties
were present. The application was for a standard
risk policy in the face amount of $25,000.00 (R 122)
showing the First Security Bank of Utah NA as
beneficiary and plaintiff herein as the contingent
beneficiary to the balance remaining if any.
Gale Holt advised the deceased Delbert Fabrizio
that it would be necessary for him to obtain a medical examination. (Deposition of Gale Holt R 54 lines
lines 3-9) Gale Holt, the soliciting agent, advised the
decedent Delbert Fabrizio that as the agent he could
not bind coverage but the application would have to
be accepted by the insurance company. (Deposition
of Gale Holt R 62, R 64, R 82) The application (R
3

17 4) signed by plaintiff provided and contained the
following language :
I have read the above questions and answers and hereby declare that they are complete and true to the best of my knowledge and
belief. I agree that only the Chairman of the
Board, the President, a Vice President, the
Secretary or an Assistant Secretary of the
Company can make, modify or discharge contracts on behalf of the Company, or waive any
of the Company's rights or requirements. I
agree that no insurance shall take effect unless and until the policy has been delivered to
and received and accepted by me and the first
premium paid during the life time of the Proposed Insured and while his state of health is
as stated in the application, except as provided
in The Conditional Receipt bearing the same
number as this application if a premium has
been paid as indicated in item 21 above and
such Receipt issued." (R 17 4)
The application for insurance by the decedent
Delbert Fabrizio was forwarded by Gale Holt, soliciting agent, to the Salt Lake branch office of defendant on June 27, 1967. (R 87)' The application was
forwarded by the Salt Lake branch office to the home
office of the defendant.
Shortly after June 27, 1967 a Conditional Receipt was delivered to the decendent Delbert Fabrizio
by Gale Holt (R 57, R 65) which also provided that
issuance of the receipt did not place any insurance in
effect for any period unless the proposed insured was
insurable and acceptable. (R 180)
4

On June 30, 1967 the decedent Delbert Fabrizio
was examined by M. Buxton, M.D. at Roosevelt,
Utah. The medical examination revealed that Delbert
Fabrizio, a man 5' 11" tall, weighing 329 pounds had
a high blood pressure abnormality. The medical report (R 177) was forwarded directly to the defendant by the doctor.
The defendant on July 7, 1967 for obvious reasons and as a result of the report of a high blood pressure abnormality acted upon the application of Delberte Fabrizio as a standard risk and declined to accept it. (R 184) That same date the home office of
defendant notified the Salt Lake office by letter that
the policy applied for was not available at the Table
H rate and that before a policy could be issued it
would have to be determined what rate would be applicable to the decedent and in order to do so would
need an additional report from the decedent Delbert
Fabrizio's attending physician and a blood pressure
re-check examination. (R. 184)
On July 10, 1967 a copy of the letter from the
home office dated July 7, 1967 rejecting the application was received by Gale Holt. (R 70, 71)' On or
about July 15, 1967 the Salt Lake office of defendant
provided Gale Holt with cost figures for various life
insurance policies at a basic Table H rate. On July
31, 1967 Gale Holt and his employer sent a letter to
the decedent Delbert Fabrizio (R 71, 72) advising
him that the medical report indicated probable high
5

blood pressure and requested the decedent Delbert
Fabrizio to come to the office of Gale Holt and his
employer to discuss the possibility of rated insurance
and to make arrangements for a blood pressure recheck. (R 181) Neither the decedent Delbert Fabrizio nor anyone on his behalf ever responded to said
letter. (R 72)
On July 18, 1967 the defendant home office sent
a letter to the Salt Lake office requesting a reply to
their letter on July 7, 1967 ( R 230), a copy of which
had been forwarded to Gale Holt. On July 26, 1967
the home office of defendant sent a second request to
the Salt Lake office requesting a reply to their letter
of July 7, 1967 which had rejected the application
and inquiring if the decedent Delbert Fabrizio was
interested in rated insurance, ( R 230, 192) a copy
of this second request was sent to Gale Holt (R 230)
and received by him on July 31, 1967.
On August 21, 1967 Gale Holt again wrote the
decedent Delbert Fabrizio advising him of the necessity and urgency of taking care of the matter. (R
73, 185) There was no response to the second letter.
(R 76, 77)
On August 31, 1967 the home office of the defendant closed their file on the case and returned to
the Salt Lake office the premium paid by the decedent Delbert Fabrizio. ( R 232, 193) On September
7 1967 the refund check was delivered by Charles
'
Soelberg
of the Salt Lake branch of defendant to Gale
6

Holt and his employer the Central Utah Insurance
Agency. (R 233) On September 9, 1967 Gale Holt
showed the refund check to the decedent Delbert
Fabrizio and tendered it to him. (R 100)
On that same date, September 9, 1967, Delbert
Fabrizio stated he wished to obtain a policy of insurance (R 107) and asked Gale Holt to return the refund check to the company and to forward the additional sum of $150.50. On that date, Gale Holt, the
soliciting agent, informed the decedent Delbert Fabrizio that no insurance was in effect and that the decedent Delbert Fabrizio would have to submit to an
additional physical examination before the company
could proceed further with processing an application
for him. (R 81, 82)
Delbert Fabrizio never did submit to the additional medical examination. On September 12, 1967
he was killed by falling logs. A letter together with
the refund check and a check for $150.50 was sent by
Gale Holt to the Salt Lake office of defendant after
the death of Delbert Fabrizio. (R 101, 102, 195) The
defendant received the letter together with the two
premiums after the death of the decedent Delbert Fabrizio. R 242) The defendant tendered back to the
heirs of the decedent Delbert Fabrizio all premiums
tendered on behalf of Delbert Fabrizio.

7

POINT I
APPELLANT THROUGH AN APPARENT ERROR HAS FAILED TO BRING THIS APPEAL
APPROPRIATELY BEFORE THIS COURT AND
RESPONDENT MOVES TO DISMISS THIS APPEAL.

The relief sought on appeal is not available to
appellant. The appellant stated in its ''RELIEF
SOUGHT ON APPEAL" the following:
'"Appellant seeks to have her motion for
summary judgment granted or in the alternative that the matter be sent back for trial."
Appellant filed its Motion for Summary Judgment on April 12, 1971. (R 413) At the pre-trial the
appellant moved for a trial date. (R 456) On April
8, 1971 the appellant wrote a letter to the attorney
for respondent indicating he had not noticed up his
Motion for Summary Judgment for hearing before
the Court and stated :
"If you wish to have this Motion called up
would you please let me know immediately so
that I can notice it up as our trial comes on
May 4th." (R. 479)
On April 12, 1971 the respondent's attorney wrote
a letter to appellant's attorney which contained the
following language:

"The trial date of May 4 is approaching
rapidly. If the case is to be tried, it will be necessary to commence making preparations to
subpoena witnesses . . . We would. therefore
like to have the matter resolved well m advance
of an intended trial date if at all possible. We
8

therefore think it would be a good idea for you
to call your Motion for Summary Judgment
up for hearing before the Court as soon as possible." (R 480)
The appellant never did notice up or call up for
hearing its Motion for Summary Judgment. At the
next hearing of record of the matter on April 21,
1971 the appellant stipulated the trial could be held
on that date.
The stipulation of appellant was made a part
of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
the Judgment. This Court's attention is respectfully
drawn to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions o'f
Law at R 415 and the Judgment at R 421 which contains the following language:
aThe parties having stipulated in open
Court that all of the depositions of the parties
and the copies o'f various correspondence, documents, papers attached thereto as exhibits
and Requests for Admissions and responses
thereto might all be received by the Court as
evidence, and the said depositions and attached exhibits and the Requests for Admissions
and the responses thereto all having been received as evidence, and the evidence being closed, and the parties having stipulated there
would be no further evidence and that the case
as submitted and the said proceedings would
constitute the trial of the matter, and the c.ause
having been submitted to the Court for its determination and decision, and the Court having inquired into the legal sufficiency of the
evidence so adduced, and having been fully ad9

vised in the premises, the Court now makes
and adopts the following:" (Emphasis ours)
At no time has appellant ever made objection
that the language above quoted did not set forth the
stipulation as made by the respective parties before
the trial Court.
Inasmuch as appellant did not notice up its Motion for Summary Judgment and subsequently stipulated that the trial could be held the appellant has
waived and lost its right to now ask this Court to
grant appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Since the trial was held on the case at bar pursuant
to a stipulation between the parties the appellant cannot ask for this Court to send the matter back for
trial. It has already been tried.
Rule 72 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
prior to the amendment which is not yet effective
contains the following language:
" (a) From Final Judgments. An appeal
may be taken to the Supreme Court. from all
final judgments, in accordance with these
rules ; . . . In equity cases the appeal may be
on questions of both law and fact. In cases at
law the appeal shall be on questions of law
only."
The appellant filed its Notice of Appeal which
contained the following language:
is hereby given that the above
named Plaintiff hereby appeals to the Supreme
Court of the State of Utah, from the courts order dated June 3, 1971 and filed June 7, 1971
~'Notice
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in the abov~-entitled court, granting Summary
Judgment m favor of Defendant, Fidelity and
Gu~ra!1tee Insurance Company and against
Plamtiff, no cause of action that the action be
~ismissed with prejudice. A~d further, appeal
is taken from the order of the court denying
Pla~ntiff's motion for Summary Judgment
agamst the Defendant, Fidelity and Guarantee Insurance Company, dated the 3rd day of
June, 1971 and filed on the 7th day of June
1971." (R 482)
'
The record at R 388 contains a memorandum
decision dated March 4, 1970 which states that defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment was denied. There is nothing in the record which states that
plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment was denied.
The only order in the record dated June 3 and
filed June 7 is the Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law and the Judgment.
Apparently the appeal was taken by appellant
on the erroneous assumption that there was an order
entered denying plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment and granting defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
As a result of this error on the part of appellant
it now appears there is nothing appropriately before
this Court and for this reason respondent moves to
dismiss the appeal. The evidence and the merits of
the case support the trial Court's decision and so the
respondent provides the following points.
11

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT HAVING FOUND FOR
THE RESPONDENTS, IT IS THE PREROGATIVE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH TO REVIEW THE EVIDENCE AND EVERY INFERENCE THAT
MAY BE FAIRLY AND R E AS 0 NAB Ly
DRAWN THEREFROM IN THE LIGHT MOST
FAVORABLE TO RESPONDENTS. APPELLANT HAD THE BURDEN OF PROOF AND
FAILED TO SUSTAIN ITS BURDEN.

This principle has been so firmly established by
this Court that it should not be necessary to reiterate
it further. This principle has been established in
many cases: Fleming v. Fleming-Felt Company, 7
Utah 2d 293, 323 P2d 712 (1958); Charlton v. Hackett, 11 Utah 2d 389, 360 P2d 176 (1961), and De
Vas v. Noble, 13 Utah 2d 133, 369 P2d 290 (1962).

While we realize that in the proceedings held the
trial Court did not observe the witnesses directly it
did read and review all the testimony of the various
witnesses, read the memorandums of all parties and
had the benefits of the argument of counsel. The trial
Court then entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law before entering the Judgment.
·
1

In the brief of appellant there is no argument
that the trial Court made erroneous findings or that
the findings were unsupported by the record. Appellant having made no objection to the findings should
be bound by them. If, the appellant were taking issue
with any of the findings it was the obligation of the
appellant to point out in its brief wherein the find12

ings of the trial Court were not supported by the evidence and to show by the record evidence which would
compel different findings.
Considering the three factors together: One, the
trial Court made findings after reviewing all the evidence and testimony and; Two, the appellant has not
objected to any of the findings and; Three, this Court
has on many occasions set forth the rule that the evidence will be viewed in a light most favorable to sustain the findings of the trial Court - Respondent
will review the evidence and the various findings of
the trial Court in the separate points which follow in
respondent's brief.
Appellant at all times had the burden of proof.
Appellant did not have sufficient evidence to sustain
the burden of proof and convince the trial Court of
the merit of its claims. The evidence showed that as
a matter of fact the plaintiff-appellant was not entitled to recover on its Complaint against defendant.
POINT III
AN APPLICATION BY THE DECEDENT DELBERT FABRIZIO FOR AN "ERT" LIFE INSURANCE POLICY WAS ONLY AN APPLICATION
WHICH HAD TO BE ACTED UPON BY THE
DULY AUTHORIZED OFFICERS OF THE DEFENDANT INSURANCE COMPANY AND A
CONTRACT OF INSURANCE ISSUED, PRESENTED TO THE DECEDENT DELBERT F ABRIZIO AND ACCEPTED BY HIM BEFORE IT
COULD TAKE EFFECT.

The application for the policy of insurance which
13

was made out by the decedent Delbert Fabrizio contained language among other things as fallows:
"I have read the above questions and answers and hereby declare that they are complete and true to the best of my knowledge and
belief. I agree that only the chairman of the
board, the president, a vice president, the secretary or an assistant secretary of the company can make, modify or discharge contracts
on behalf of the company, or waive any of the
company's rights or requirements. I agree that
no insurance shall take effect unless and until
the policy has been delivered to and received
and accepted by me and the first premium paid
during the lifetime of the proposed insured
while his state of health is as stated in the application, except as provided in the conditional
receipt bearing the same number as this application if a premium has been paid as indicated in item 21 above and such receipt issued.
Dated at Roosevelt, Utah on June 27, 1967
Signature of
Proposed Insured
/s/ Delbert Fabrizio"
(R174)
The above quoted language from the application
for the "ERT" (Executive Reducing Term) life insurance policy is amply clear under the terms of the
application that no policy of insurance could take effect unless the policy was made and issued by one of
the named officials in the defendant company. The
decedent Delbert Fabrizio agreed in writing (by
signing the application) to be bound by the above
quoted terms.
14

. "In the ordina~y ~ffectuation of a policy
of msurance, negotiations therefor are initiated 1?Y an application by the person seeking
such msurance. 'The application itself is not
the contract, but is a mere offer or proposal
for a contract of insurance. It is merely a step
in the creation of the insurance contract. Before the contract of insurance is effected and
any contractual relationship exists between
the parties it is necessary that the application
be accepted by the insurer, since it is well settled that insurance companies are not compelled to accept every application presented and
may stipulate upon what terms and for what
period of time the risk will be accepted." ( 43
Arn J ur 2d Insurance Section 209 at page 265)
"Until the application is accepted, no contractual relationship exists between an applicant for insurance and the insurance company.
The acceptance of the application or proposal
for insurance is necessary to make the policy
of insurance founded thereon binding and effective, especially where by the terms of the
application its approval is required before the
risk shall attach.
'''As a general rule and apart from express stipulations to a contrary effect, a contract of insurance is consummated by and not
until the unconditional acceptance of the application or proposal for such insur?-nc~, and
this is the rule even though the application or
proposal is accompanied by the pay~ent of .the
premium. The acceptance must be m the lif~
time of the applicant. If the death of the applicant intervenes, no contract is effected." ( 43
Am Jur 2d Insurance Section 210 at page 267)
15

Similar language is found in Couch on Insurance as fallows:
"~n the law of insurance, an application,
sometimes referred to as a proposal is a request for a contract of insurance to be issued
to the applicant by an insurer. It is not a contract, but a mere proposal for insurance, which
is usually understood to mean, under a form
of contract in use by the insurer. Acceptance
of the offer by the insurer is required for the
completion of a contract of insurance.· In the
absence of provisions for temporary insurance, even the acceptance of the application
does not effect a contract of insurance between
the applicant and the insurer, where the attachment of the risk is conditioned upon and
delivery of a formal policy. As hereinbefore
observed, however, once the insurance contract
is completed, the application may be a part
thereof." (Couch on Insurance 2d Section 7 :1
at pages 27 and 28)

POINT IV
THE APPLICA'Tl:ON OF THE DECEDENT
DELBERT 'FABRIZIO FOR A LIFE INSURANCE POLICY WAS RE'JECTED BY THE COMP ANY AND NOTIFICATION THEREON GIVEN
AND 'THE PREMIUM RETURNED TO THE
DECEDENT PRIOR TO HIS DEATH.

On July 1, 1967 after considering the applica·
tion of the decedent Delbert Fabrizio the defendant
declined to accept it and sent the following memor·
andum to its Salt Lake office:
"Subject to a report from this individual's
attending physician and a blood pressure re·
check, we can only consider him at a minimum
16

of our ~able H rate .. ~owever, be.fore we proceed with the addit10nal reqmrements , it
should just be determined whether Mr. F~bri
zio is inter~ste~ in rated insurance. Also you
should advise of an alternate plan since the
ERT policy is not available at the above rate."
(R 184)
Although Gale Holt wrote two letters advising
Delbert Fabrizio of the rejection of the application,
Delbert Fabrizio did not respond to the requests of
Gale Holt to contact him.
On August 31, 1967 as a result of receiving no
response to the memo of July 7, 1967 the home office
of defendant closed its file on the application of Delbert Fabrizio and returned the original premium to
be delivered to Delbert Fabrizio. The memorandum
accompanying the refund check contained the followmg:
"We have had no reply to our memo of
July 7 and have filed this case incomplete.
Please have the enclosed check for $75.50 delivered to Mr. Fabrizio and instruct the agent
to mail the attached postcard when delivery of
the check has been accomplished." (R 193)
The refund was tendered to Delbert Fabrizio by
Gale Holt on September 9, 1967. (R 100) Delbert
Fabrizio was killed September 12, 1967.
The trial Court made and entered its Findings
of Fact that the application of Delbert Fabrizio was
rejected and notification was given to Delbert Fabrizio and the premium was tendered back to Delbert
Fabrizio prior to his death. (R 415.:419) ·The findings of the trial Court (R 417, 418) were supported
17

by the record and there is no evidence to the contrary.
The action of the defendant resulted in a complete rejection of the application of Delbert Fabrizio
and sufficient notice of the rejection prior to the
death of Delbert Fabrizio.
POINT V
NO COUNTER-OFFER OF INSURANCE WAS
MADE BY DEFENDANT TO THE DECEASED
DELBERT FABRIZIO.
(a) GALE HOLT WAS WITHOUT AUTHORITY TO MAKE AN OFFER OF INSURANCE ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANTS OR
TO BIND DEFENDANT ON ANY POLICIES AND THE LIMITATION ON HIS
AUTHORITY WAS COMMUNICATED TO
THE DECEDENT DELBERT FABRIZIO.

Gale Holt, the soliciting agent, notified Delbert
Fabrizio on the date the application for insurance
was signed that Gale Holt had limited authority.
"I says, nobody can bind life insurance. It
is only acceptable as to the provisions of the
company." (R 62)
The Agency Agreement under which Gale Holt
as an employee of the Central Utah Insurance Agency
operated was one of very limited authority. In part
the agreement limits the authority of the agent as
follows:
''The Agent is not authorized: to receive
any mone:y on behalf of the qoi;ipany except
first premmms ·to extend credit many respect
on behalf of th~ Company; to modify or waive
any provision in any policy or application; to
18

a polic~ unless a full first premium recited m the policy has been paid and the named
Insured is in good health to the best of the
Agent's knowledge; or to make any contract
o~ behalf of the Company, except in accordance
with t~e Co.mpany's conditional receipt form
when given m exchange for the first premium,
or part thereof, paid with an original application for insurance or annuity." (R 196)
The limited authority of the agent was set forth
in the body of the application signed by Delbert Fabrizio and in the conditional receipt (R 180) and by
signing the application Delbert Fabrizio agreed to
the limitations stated therein.
d~live.r

(b) ONLY THE NAMED OFFICIALS IN
THE DEFENDANT COMPANY COULD
MAKE, MODIFY OR DISCHARGE CONTRACTS ON BEHALF OF THE COMPANY,
OR WAIVE ANY OF THE COMPANY'S
RIGHTS OR REQUIREMENTS.

The application signed by the decendent Delbert
Fabrizio contained the following language:
"I agree that only the Chairman of the
Board, the President, a Vice President, the
Secretary or an Assistant Secretary of the
Company can make, modify or dischar~e contracts on behalf of the Company, or waive any
of the Company's rights or requirements." (R

174)

The burden of proof of a counter-offer was on
the plaintiff-appellant. At no time was any evidence
introduced to show either:
1. That the authority to make a counter-offer
19

extended beyond the previous named officials in the
defendant company, or to show:
2. That one of the named officials in the defendant company made the alleged counter- offer.
The trial Court appropriately refused to make
a finding of a counter-offer as any such finding
would be wholly unsupported by the record.
The exhibit upon which the appellant relies to
establish the alleged counter-offer (appellant's brief
page 18) contained the following language when it
left the home office of defendant:
"Subject to a report from this individual's
attending physician and a blood pressure recheck, we can only consider him at a minimum
of our Table H rate. However, before we proceed with the additional requirements, it
should first be determined whether Mr. Fabrizio is interested in rated insurance. Also,
you should advise of an alternate plan, since
the ERT policy is not available at the above
rate." (R 189)
Even if this Court were to overlook the failure
of the appellant to establish the authority of the individual who allegedly made the counter-offer the
language quoted above could not be construed as a
counter-offer.
THE ALLEGED COUNTER-OFFER IF
THERE WAS ONE WAS WITHDRAWN BY
DEFENDANT PRIOR TO ITS ACCEPTANCE BY APPELLANT.
(c)
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Having received no response to the memo previously set forth (which appellant alleges is the
counter-offer). the defendant sent two follow up inquiries requesting a response to the memorandum.
('R 191, 192)
On August 31, 1967, nearly two months later,
after receiving no response the defendant home office sent the following memorandum to the Salt Lake
office of defendant:
"We have had no reply to our memo of
July 7 and have filed this case incomplete.
Please have the enclosed check for $75.50 delivered to Mr. Fabrizio and instruct the agent
to mail the attached postcard when delivery of
the check has been accomplished." (R 193)
This memorandum constituted a withdrawal or
revocation of the alleged counter-dffer prior to any
alleged acceptance by appellant. This information
was communicated to Delbert Fabrizio and the premium tendered back to him prior to his death and
prior to the date of his alleged acceptance of the asserted counter-offer.
POINT VI
THE CONDITIONAL RECEIPT ATTACHED TO
THE INSURANCE APPLICATION DID NOT
CONTAIN AMBIGUITIES OR CONFLICTING
PROVISIONS AND DELBERT FABRIZIO FAILED TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS CONTAINED THEREIN.

The appellant devotes five points of its brief to
the theory of ambiguities in the conditional receipt.
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The entire. argument is inapplicable to this case because as is previously pointed out in this brief th~
entire file on appellant's application was closed and
the premium was tendered back to appellant prior
to his death. For this reason it does not matter wh~
ther the conditional receipt contanied an ambiguity
or not.
Respondent, however, will respond to the arguments contained in appellant's brief concerning ambiguities.
As has been previously stated in this brief insurance applications are not contracts of insurance
and are treated differently. Appellant cites four
Utah cases in its brief at page 6. Not one of the cases
cited involve either a life insurance policy, an application or a conditional receipt. All four cases involve
construction of language in automobile casualty and
fire policies.

Jorgensen v. Hartford Fire Insurance Company,
13 Utah 2d 303 (1962), 373 P2d 580, defined words
"fire" and "direct loss by fire" in a fire insurance '
policy. Stout v. Washington Fire and Marine Insurance Company, 14 Utah 2d 414 ( 1963, 385 P2d 608,
defined the word "premises" in a fire insurance policy. P. E. Ashton Company v. Jaynes, 17 Utah 2d 162
( 1965), 406 P2d 306 defined the word ''theft" in an
auteomobile insurance policy. Christensen v. Fanners Insurance Exchange, 21Utah2d 194 (1968) 443
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P2d 385, def ~µed the word and phrase "used" or "being used in the automobile business." . ·

~ Eye~y ·case· Git~d .by appellant to sustain its

theory of insurance coverage involved a situation in
which the policy applied for by the applicant was
available to the applicant and after the medical examination the insurance coma)fy· retained· the premium. In no case cited was applicant advised the
policy a plied for was not available· a:n:d in no case
cited was the premium tendered back to the applicant prior to his death.
· ·
In Prince v. Western Empire Life lns?krance
Company, 19 Utah.2d 174 (1967), 428 P2d-1()3this
Court stated:
· ·,
"During the lifetime.of applicant no notice of rejection was ever given to him, and no
return.of the premium paid was ever offered.
The applicant had no intimation that he was
not insured or that ·he should act so as to J)r&o
vent his ·$80,0.00.00 .worth of life insurance:
from lapsing."
As we haye pointed out previously ip. this brief
the facts in the Prince case are completely OJ>p~site.
to the f a:cts in this case on appeal. The Janguage i#:
the conditional
rec~ipt in thi_s case iS set forth b~fo~~:·
-. .
:: .
-

'

'

- '

.

~

· "This ·Payment Is Made tind Accepteq
Subject To The Following Conditions: :: : ,
. Insurance ·under the terms. of the· policy
_applied for and suppl~mentarx p:,oyision (~.)
if applied for, and subJ~ct _to the 'lnnits ~J2e(!I~
fied below shall take effect as of the last of any
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medical examinations or tests required under
the rules and practices of the Company or the
date of this payment whichever shall be the
later, provided on that date the Proposed Insured ( s), in the opinion of the Company's
authorized officers at its Home Office was/
were insurable and acceptable under th~ rules
and practices of the Company as a standard
risk for the policy and/or supplementary provision in the amount, on the plan and otherwise exactly as applied for; otherwise there
shall be no liability on the part of the Company
except to return this payment in the form of
the Company's check." (R 180, 309)
The conditional receipt in this case required conditions not set forth in the binding receipt in the
Prince case as fallows:
"Insurance takes effect as of last of any
medical examinations required."
The applicant Delberet Fabrizio was notified an
additional examination was required. (R 184) Delbert Fabrizio knew of the requirement months before
his death. ( R 184, 77)
The conditional receipt had another requirement not found in the Prince receipt that the applicant
must be ·"insurable and acceptable ... as a standard
risk." Obviously a man 5' 11" tall weighing 329
pounds with high blood pressure is not a standard
risk.
The respondent in its Notice of Rejection of the
application stated if the applicant were to be consid·
ered at all it would have to be at a minimum of the
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Table "H" rate. A standard risk .rate has no letter
and the first rated policy level is ~'A/' It is plain to
see Delbert Fabrizio's minimum rate was several
steps away from a standard risk rate. In addition the
insurance company advised Delbert .Fab~izio the
"ERT" policy was not available ·at "the above rate
(Table H) ." (R 184)
That the conditions set forth in the conditional
receipt must be met before the insurance company
can be bound is a point well established by this Court
in the case of Jones v. New York Li/e Insurance Company, 253 P 200 (1927).
In appellant's brief at page 15, appellant stated
that the defendant accepted payment for a rated
policy. This statement is unsupported by any evidence in the record and is directly contradicted in appellant's own brief at page 5 where appellant admits
the two premium checks (the alleged payment for
the rated policy) were not mailed to respondent until
after the death of Delbert Fabrizio which had occurred that morning and the two checks were not received by respondent until the day following the death
of Delbert Fabrizio.
In Couch on Insurance 2d Section 7 :6 at page
29 the following is found:
'''An application for insurance is revoked
by the death of the applicant before approval
and acceptance of the application."
There is no case cited by appellant which stands
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for the proposition that as a result of an ambiguity
in an application for insurance or the accompanying
conditional receipt that an applicant is covered by
insurance even though the insurance company rejects
the application, gives notice thereof, closes the file,
returns the premium and tenders it back to the applicant prior to the applicant's death.
In Mofrad v. New York Life Ins. Co., 206 F 2d
491 (10th Cir. 1953) a case arising out of the Federal District Court of Utah the Court right after citing Janes v. New York Life Ins. Co. (Ibid) decided
by this Court held that:
"The provisions in the application agreement do not fix the effective date of the insurance contract. They simply impose conditions
precedent to the taking effect of the insurance
coverage . . . When read together they mean
that the insurance coverage shall take effect
only in the event the conditions precedent specified in the application are fulfilled."
The Court refused to find insurance coverage
where the applicant failed to take the medical examination required, before his death.
In Killpack v. Natianal Old Line Insurance Company, 229 F 2d 851 (10th Cir. 1956) a case heard by
the Federal District Court of Utah the original application for insurance had been rejected by the insurance company for the failure of the applicant to
have a physical examination and report submitted
timely to the insurance company. The applicant then
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!

.made a new application after an in~rvening birthday but failed to sign the amendment to date the
contract so as to show the applicant's insurance at
50 (the age prior to the birthday). The applicant
died before signing the amendment and the Court
held the condition contained in the binding receipt
had not been met and therefore there was no insurance coverage.
Once again this Court's attention is invited to
the fact that the respondent insurance company rejected the application and tendered back. the premium of appellant prior to appellant's death.
CONCLUSION
1. Appellant seeks relief which is not available
and appellant appeals from orders which were not
made or entered by the lower Court and the appeal
should be dismissed.
2. The application for appellant was rejected
by the respondent and the premium tendered back to
the appellant prior to his death. All the argument of
appellant concerning ambiguity is moot and inapplicable to this case.
3. No counter-offer was made by respondent
and the subsequent premiums tendered to the respondent were neither sent by the soliciting agent
nor received by respondent until after the death of
the applicant.
4. No application for insurance· was ever accepted by respondent and no policy was ever issued.
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5. The trial Court appropriately entered a
Judgment in favor of the defendant and against the
plaintiff-appellant.
Respondent respectfully requests this Court to
either dismiss this appeal or to affirm the Judgment
rendered by the trial Court.
Respectfully submitted,
JACK L. SCHOENHALS
721 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorney for Respondent
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